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This economic experiment tests the positive relationship between 
perceived intention and positive reciprocity by altering material-payoff 
structures in treatments, or material-payoff approach. To design the 
treatments, this study applies a signalling model to explain how the 
intention of an action is signalled and perceived. As a result from the 
model, cost of an action positively relates to the perceived intention. The 
results from seventy-nine subjects who participated in this four-session 
hand-run experiment that was double-blindly organized between August - 
September 2011 support the relationship. Moreover, this study 
hypothesizes on consistent decisions across treatments with different 
levels of perceived intention, and the results support the hypotheses. The 
insight into sacrificing and rewarding is the significant implication in this 
study. 
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1. Introduction 
 
"Intentions count in your actions." 
Abu Bakr 
 
This economic experiment aims to test a relationship between perceived intention and 
positive reciprocity by applying a different approach -- material payoff approach. Moreover, 
to design treatments, we apply a signalling model to theoretically explain how the intention 
of an action is signalled and perceived. This article consists of four sections: literature 
review, methodology, results, and concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
In previous studies on kindness and reciprocity (Bolton & Ockenfels 2000 and 2005, 
Charness & Rabin 2002, Cox & Deck 2005, Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger 2004, Falk & 
Fischbacher 2006, Falk, Fehr & Fischbacher 2003 and 2008, McCabe, Rigdon & Smith 
2003, Stanca, Bruni & Corazzini 2009), the latest controversial factor that determines how 
one perceives kindness (or unkindness) from an action is -- perceived intention from the 
action.1 For instance, stepping on someone's foot makes a victim perceive more 
unkindness if he perceives that the doer intentionally and unkindly stepped on his foot, and 
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1
 Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009) defined a new factor named motivation but, in the article's model, the motivation 
and intention are closely related; hence the effects of motivation and intention can be aggregated into only intention. 
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vice versa for a kind action. Precisely, perceived intention from an action increases one's 
perception to kindness or unkindness (Falk & Fischbacher 2006). 
 
As a consequence from perceiving that an action is intentionally done, reciprocity (either 
positive or negative) is likely to be induced; as negative reciprocity, the victim is likely to 
open a fight if he perceives that he was intentionally stepped on his foot. So, in this 
context, the important factor to induce reciprocity is the perceived intention that the victim 
perceives, not the doer's real intention which is his private information. 
 
To test the relationship between perceived intention and reciprocity, previous studies 
designed two treatments as two-stage games, that a first mover decides then a second 
mover will decide after observing the first mover's decision by applying two approaches: 
random-device approach in McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2003) and Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2008), and information approach in Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009). The 
random-device approach distinguishes two treatments by letting the second mover play 
against a human-first mover in one treatment but play against a device-first mover (such 
as a dice or coin) in the other. Since a human mover can show intention of his decision but 
a device mover cannot, this approach introduces perceived intention from the human's 
action higher than from the device's one; as a consequence, the studies hypothesized that 
a human mover could induce reciprocity more than a device mover, and the results 
supported the hypotheses. 
 
By having a different hypothesis that the second mover will perceive more intention of a 
kind decision, and will reciprocate more, if the first mover makes his kind decision without 
knowing possible consequences of the decision (like pure altruism where one 
unconditionally gives kindness), Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009) applied information 
approach to test the hypothesis. The approach distinguishes two treatments by information 
provided: full information and partial information. In the full-information treatment, subjects 
know that the game has two stages; in the partial-information treatment, subjects know 
that the game has only one stage and surprisingly the subjects know that there is another 
stage (the second stage) after the first stage has been completed. Hence, according to the 
hypothesis, the reciprocity rate in the partial information treatment was expected to be 
higher than in the full information treatment, and the result supported the hypothesis. 
 
Different from previous studies, this study questions that how intention of an action is 
perceived in human-human interaction with full-information treatments, neither device-
human interaction nor partial-information; hence, this study applies the material-payoff 
approach, which is a non-device approach with full information, and develops a signalling 
model that explains how intention of an action is signalled and perceived.  
 
Like in many previous studies (for examples, Falk et al. (2003), Bolton & Ockenfels 2005), 
the material-payoff approach, ideally, introduces an independent variable in one treatment 
but not in the other treatment by using treatments with different material-payoff structures. 
For instance, if you want to test the relationship between stake and decision in a dictator 
game, your experiment is easily designed by using (at least) two dictator games: low and 
high stakes. 
 
Designing a material-payoff-approach experiment like the previous exhibit sounds simple, 
but to test the relationship between perceived intention and positive reciprocity in this 
study is not. Why? Let us see; if we want to test the relationship, by imitating from the case 
of stake and dictator's decision, we need two treatments with different perceived intention 
from an action: low and high. How can we quantify the perceived intention? Re-think about 
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the definition of intention (purpose, plan, aim, etc.), we see that intention is intangible and 
naturally unmeasurable, hence, unquantifiable. Which will be presented in the next 
section, we develop a theoretical method to quantify the perceived intention by using a 
signalling model; hence we can theoretically design treatments with different perceived 
intention from an action. 
 
Moreover, the material-payoff approach can solve the problem of changing preferences 
over human and device that made the conclusions in the random-device-approach 
experiments be obscured; rather than the perceived intention, a subject might want to 
reciprocate a human opponent more than a device one, hence results from the 
experiments were confounded. Although Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2008) concerned the 
problem and tried to solve it by its methodology, applying a non-device experiment is still 
the best solution. 
 
3. The Methodology and Model  
 
This section presents methodology in this study and is organized into: presenting the trust 
game that is used in this study, developing how intention of an action is signalled and 
perceived by using a signalling model, hypotheses, designed treatments, and experiment 
protocol.  
 
3.1 Trust game 
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Fig.1 Designed trust game in this study 
 
As presented in Fig. 1, this study uses reciprocity-related treatments named "trust game" 
that, in general, is a sequential two-player game which a first mover decides to stop   or 
trustfully continue   and, after observing that the first mover continued, a second mover 
responses: selfishly take   or reciprocally return  . In this study the trust game is designed 
and focused on positive-reciprocity interaction -- kindness is given by the first mover and is 
returned to him by the second mover; the first mover decides whether to stop or give the 
second mover's   additional points by continuing the game (kindness giving); if the first 
mover continued, the second mover decides to take all the additional points or return   
points, where      , to the first mover (kindness returning). 
 
Since only the first mover's continuing   leads to the second mover's decision node, hence 
we will test the relationship between the second mover's perceived intention from 
continuing and positive reciprocity. Moreover, the first mover's continuing is costly (if    ) 
or beneficial (if    ) to him; hence, which will be used in the next section, we define the 
cost of continuing as the difference between   and  . 
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DEFINITION 1    Cost of continuing is      . 
 
3.2 Intention of continuing -- signal, perceive, and affect positive reciprocity 
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Fig.2 Signalling game of trust 
 
How is intention of continuing signalled and perceived? How does it affect positive 
reciprocity? This section will answer the questions by using a signalling model. As result 
which will be presented in Proposition 1, cost of continuing signals the first mover's 
intention of doing so; as a consequence which will be presented in Proposition 2, the 
second mover who observed the first mover chose costly continuing will perceive more 
intention of the decision and will be induced to positively reciprocate the first mover's 
kindness from the continuing. 
 
As presented in Fig. 2, the designed trust game is re-structured into a signalling game of 
trust that the first mover's type       is randomly selected by nature   then he 
accordingly makes an optimal decision. The type represents the first mover's real intention 
of continuing, or kindness intention; it affects the first mover's utility function (which will be 
presented in the following section) by      means he has no intention to give the second 
mover's favours and is likely to stop the game, and vice versa. After the first mover has 
made his decision, the second mover who can observe the decision but do not know the 
first mover's type optimally makes a decision according to information he has, which is the 
first mover's decision. 
 
To simply illustrate the answers, compare two extreme cases: continuing is hugely costly 
(   ) and hugely beneficial (   ). In the former case, only the first mover who has high 
enough kindness intention, say      
 , will continue the game whereas, in the latter 
case, the first mover who will continue the game has      
  where   
    
 ; hence i) the 
cost of continuing affects the optimal decision by affecting the critical value of kindness 
intention (  
  and   
 ); precisely, the cost of continuing positively relates to the critical 
value. Then the second mover, who observed the first mover's continuing  , utilize the 
information of the first mover's decision to update his expectation on the first mover's 
kindness intention by  (  | ); ii) the expectation  (  | ) is equivalent to the second 
mover's perceived intention from continuing. In other words, since the second mover 
knows the structure of game, he knows the cost of continuing and knows the positive 
relationship between the cost and critical value of the first mover's kindness intention; iii) 
the second mover can derive a positive relationship between the cost and the perceived 
intention from continuing; since  (  |     
 )   (  |     
 ), it implies the relationship. 
Last, as mentioned that perceived intention from an action positively induces reciprocity, 
iv) we can derive a positive relationship between the cost of continuing and reciprocity 
rate. 
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Besides the simple illustration, the following presentation will visualize the answers by 
analyzing the signalling game of trust. The analysis consists of three steps: the first 
mover's optimal decision, the second mover's optimal decision and how the intention is 
signalled and perceived. 
 
3.2.1 The first mover's optimal decision 
 
To analyze the first mover's optimal decision, we will simply modify the simplest and most 
well-known reciprocity model -- altruism -- by inserting the perceived intention into it. As 
presented in (1), 
  (    ̂   )    ( )      ̂  ( )                                                           ( ) 
a first mover derives his utility    from a weighted sum between two parts -- his material 
payoff    and the second mover's material payoff    -- by having     ̂     as the 
relative weight;2 the weight affects the first mover's decision by the more the weight is the 
more propensities to choose continuing the game. Both movers' material payoffs are 
determined by strategy profile   (     ) where, according to the trust game,    *   + 
and    *   +; The relative weight is derived from the interaction between the first 
mover's kindness intention       and the perceived intention from the second mover 
  ̂    . Since the first mover makes his decision before the second mover does, he 
simply takes it as a constant; without loss of generality, we normalize   ̂   . 
 
According to the signalling game, we derive the first mover's optimal decision function (or 
best response function)     by: 
   (     )  {     |   {
         (   )
         (   )
 }                                        ( ) 
where  (   )  
   (   )
   (   )
 and       (    )  ,   -.  
 
Similar to the previous illustration, the first mover's optimal decision is contingent to his 
kindness intention and the critical value of kindness intention   which is positively related 
with the cost of continuing      , as presented in Lemma 1; besides the cost of 
continuing, the critical value is depended on   and  , and his expectation on the second 
mover's decision  .3 
 
LEMMA 1  The critical value of kindness intention  (   ) is increased in  . 
 
 
 
                                            
2
 In any reciprocity-related model, the first player's utility function is simply expressed as   ̃         , and vice 
versa for the second player. The function models the first mover who derives his utility from a weighted sum between 
his material payoff   and reciprocal payoff    by having the reciprocal parameter (which this study calls it "kindness 
intention")      as the relative weight; this is the common feature of expressing reciprocity-related models in 
previous studies, while the difference of each study's model is how the study expressed   . For examples, the altruism 
is expressed      ; the reciprocity model by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) is expressed         where    is 
the first player's kindness-perceiving function and    is the player's kindness-giving function; the reciprocity model by 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) is expressed as      ̂  ̃  ̃ where   ̂ is the intention factor (which this study calls it 
"perceived intention"), and   ̃ and   ̃ are the kindness-perceiving and kindness-giving functions respectively (but the 
functions are defined differently from the Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004)'s model). 
3
   is equivalent to the first-order belief in the context of psychological game. See Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti 
(1989). 
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3.2.2 Perceived intention from the first mover 
 
According to intrinsic assumptions of game theory, the second mover can access to the 
best response function;4 hence the second mover can utilize this information and form his 
perceived intention from the first mover's decision. Let   ̂ be the second mover's perceived 
intention from the first mover's decision. As discussed in the previous illustration that the 
first mover's decision    signals his kindness intention and makes the second mover 
update an expectation on the first mover's kindness intention  ,  |  -, we equivalently 
define the following: 
 
DEFINITION 2      ̂   ,  |  -.
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Precisely, let  (  ) be a prior distribution function over the first mover's kindness intention; 
observing the first mover's continuing makes the second mover know that     (   ), 
hence he updates his expectation by   ̂   ,  | -  ∫     (  | )
 
 (  )
. 
 
According to Lemma 1 and Definition 2, we get a relationship between the cost of 
continuing   and perceived intention   ̂: 
 
PROPOSITION 1      ̂ is weakly increased in  .
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3.2.3 Effect of perceived intention to the second mover's optimal decision 
 
Next, we will see how the perceived intention affects the second mover's optimal decision. 
As presented in (3),  
  (    ̂   )    ( )      ̂  ( )                                                               ( ) 
is the second mover's utility function.  
 
Without loss of generality, we normalize      and, as presented in (4),  
   (  ̂)  {     |   {
       ̂   
       ̂   
 }                                                 ( ) 
derive the second mover's best response function. The function implies that a second 
mover who perceived high enough the first mover's kindness intention (  ̂   ) will 
reciprocate. Since   ̂ weakly and positively relates with the cost of continuing  ,  
 
PROPOSITION 2    Reciprocity rate is weakly increased in  . 
 
Hence, we have accomplished this analysis to show how the intention of continuing is 
signalled and perceived, and how the perceived intention affects reciprocity. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
                                            
4
 Since game theory has an intrinsic assumption that form of each player's utility function is publicly known (but 
individual parameter like type is still private information), everybody can exploit this public knowledge and access to 
each player's best response function. 
5
 Similarly, if we consider how the first mover perceives the second mover's kindness intention,   ̂   ,  |  -; the 
first mover does not know    hence he uses his expectation that     . Since applying   ̂   ,  |    - instead 
of the normalization (which   ̂   ) does not affect the Lemma 1 and the following analysis, we will continue applying 
  ̂    for simplicity. 
6
 We conclude that the relationship is weak since it is possible that the distribution function has some ranges 
,     -     which ∫     (  | )
 (    )
 (    )
  . 
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 H1: In treatments with equal level of perceived intention, reciprocity rates are equal. 
 H2: Reciprocity rate in treatment with low level of perceived intention (low-intention   
    treatment) is lower than the rate in treatment with high level of perceived intention 
    (high-intention treatment). 
 H3: A subject who chose taking   in high-intention treatment will choose taking   in low-
    intention treatment. 
 H4: A subject who chose returning   in low-intention treatment will choose returning   in 
    high-intention  treatment. 
 
As presented, this study tests four hypotheses (H1 - H4) that can be grouped into two 
issues: the relationship between perceived intention and positive reciprocity (H1 and H2) 
and consistent decisions across treatment with different levels of perceived intention (H3 
and H4).7  
 
Besides testing H2 that the perceived intention positively induces reciprocity rate like 
previous studies did, this study tests H1 to confirm that the same level of perceived 
intention induces the same reciprocity rate. Moreover, this study questions on a new issue 
-- the consistent decisions across treatments -- that previous studies did not concern. 
 
3.4 Treatments 
 
According to the designed trust game presented in Fig. 1, the material-payoff approach 
designs treatments with different material-payoff structures, precisely, different 
(         )    . According to the Proposition 1, to introduce different levels of perceived 
intention from continuing, the treatments are focused on varying the cost of continuing 
     . To avoid being confounded, the treatments are fixed as             and 
   . 
Table 1 Treatments and introduced factors 
Name     
Level of 
perceived 
intention  
Stake 
(classified 
by  ) 
Equal 
split  
Low-payoff 
and high-
intention 
treatment 
(LHT) 
50 50 High Low No 
High-payoff 
and high-
intention 
treatment 
(HHT) 
100 100 High High No 
Low-payoff 
and low-
intention 
treatment 
(LLT) 
50 150 Low Low 
Yes 
(with   
choice) 
                                            
7
 Hypotheses H3 and H4 is logically equivalent:           where    reciprocate in low intention treatment, 
   reciprocate in high intention treatment, and    not (    take in low intention treatment). But, to test each 
hypothesis, measurement methods are different. 
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As presented in Table 1, this study designs three treatments: LHT, HHT and LLT. By the 
Proposition 1, we know that continuing in LHT and HHT introduces equal level of 
perceived intention (           ) but higher than in LLT (                ).  
 
According to the hypotheses, precisely, we will test whether the reciprocity rates in LHT 
and HHT are equal but higher than in LLT (H1 and H2), will test whether subjects who 
chose taking   in LHT will do the same in LLT (H3), and will test whether subjects who 
chose returning   in LLT will do the same in LHT. 
 
Besides the perceived intention, the table also notifies other two confounding factors 
(stake and equal split) that need to be discussed. To design treatments with equal level of 
perceived intention from continuing, being confounded by an effect of different stake is 
unavoidable. And the effect is unpredictable; it may increase or decrease reciprocity rate. 
 
Unlike the effect of different stake, the effect of equal split is introduced to the return 
choice   in LLT to make the conclusion of the effect of perceived intention to positive 
reciprocity be stronger. Precisely, since inequity aversion behavior makes a subject prefer 
the equal choice   to the other choice  , the effect of equal split increases reciprocity 
rate;8 but we expect the rate in LLT is lower than in the other treatments; hence observing 
that the rate in LLT is lower than in the other treatments implies that the effect of perceived 
intention is stronger than the effect of equal split choice. 
 
Moreover, to design a clean experiment, the treatments are controlled for other effects: 
 1. Fixing   and   controls an effect of reference point.9 Moreover, as presented in (2)   
   that  (   )  
   (   )
   (   )
 , besides     and   affect the critical value; hence they affect 
   the perceived intention. Fixing them let us focus on the effect of cost of continuing to 
   positive reciprocity. 
 2. According to the critical value  (   ), to control an effect of the first mover's      
   expectation on the second mover's decision  , we introduce strategy method (which 
   subjects contingently make decisions in both roles without knowing their opponents) 
   and anonymous environment (which will be explained in the next section);10 doing  
   so makes each subject form a constant belief that he is playing against an      
   anonymous opponent, hence he forms constant expectations on the anonymous   
   opponent's decisions. 
 3. Fixing     controls an effect of initial endowment. 
 4. To control an effect of different social welfare, either   or   gives the same amount of 
   total sum of material payoffs of all movers, ∑   (   )
   
    ∑   (   )
   
   .
11 
 5. To control an effect of competition, either   or   gives the second mover material   
   payoffs at least equal to the first mover's,   (    )    (    ) for any   .
12 
 6. To limit an effect of loss aversion, everybody gets strictly positive material payoffs for 
   any strategy profile,   ( )    for all   *   + and for all  .
13 
 
 
 
                                            
8
 See Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
9
 See Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). 
10
 For more detail about the strategy method, see Stanca, Bruni and Corazzini (2009). 
11
 See Charness and Rabin (2002). 
12
 Normally, the second mover prefers a choice that      (advantage) to      (disadvantage); this effect is 
called "competition". See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) for more detail. 
13
 See Bhirombhakdi (2011). 
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3.5 Experiment protocol 
 
Subjects of sixty-four economic and fifteen non-economic undergraduate students ( =79) 
voluntarily participated in a four-session hand-run economic experiment (one subject 
participated once) that was double-blindly conducted. The experiment was organized 
during 24th August - 6th September 2011 at Chulalongkorn University, Thailand. Subjects 
knew the experiment from printed and social-network distributed announcements that 
provided necessary information especially session length, payment and activities. 
 
To make them concerned cost and benefit of the participation, session length (one and a 
half hour) and minimum-maximum payment (100-400 baht) were informed in 
announcements. Moreover, the announcements informed that activities would compose of 
providing information in questionnaires and making decisions in various situations where 
the payment was depended on his decisions and other subjects' decisions in the 
experiment that had four sessions. From data of subject's monthly income, the minimum 
payment per hour (33 baht/hour) is slightly higher than subject's average income per hour 
(32 baht/hour).14  
 
The payment was divided into two parts: shown-up fee (50 baht) and payment from 
decisions. The announcements informed that subjects would get paid within a month after 
the experiment end, but did not inform the payment process; this is to avoid subjects who 
only wanted the shown-up fee and unlikely to make decisions. Subjects knew the payment 
process after all decisions had been made. 
 
In each session, subjects did three types of tasks: providing information in questionnaires, 
deciding in a dictator game, and deciding in eight trust games (which three games are 
presented here). The experiment applies strategy method that subjects contingently made 
decisions as both roles and in all games. Before making decisions in trust games, subjects 
were required to answer some questions to make them understand the game. To make 
them push more effort in understanding the game, a subject who correctly answered all 
questions got paid. Staff checked each subject's answers, publicly announced key of the 
questions and publicly answered some questions concerning the games but did not 
answer questions that would affect subjects' decision makings in the games. 
 
Moreover, this study introduced two types of environment: framing-effect-free and 
anonymous. By using bias-free words like "situation" instead of "game", "person" instead 
of "player", "decision A" instead of "stop", etc., framing-effect-free environment was 
introduced to make treatments were -- neutral, a subject was not convinced that a 
treatment was either game or reciprocity-related situation. Second, to prevent being 
confounded by changing decision according to opponents that, for instance, subject may 
likely to reciprocate friendly more than rivalry opponent, anonymous environment was 
introduced by informing that each subject's opponents would be randomly drawn from 
more than fifty participants in this experiment; no one knew one's opponents, the 
opponents were -- anonymous. 
 
Last, this study concerned another important theoretical assumption, independent 
decisions between games. Eight trust games were separated into four sets (two games 
per set) and inserted in an envelope. Staff handed the envelope over each subject, 
announced rules and regulations, monitored subjects' behavior, and warned them against 
                                            
14
 Average total income is 7700 baht/month. Using 20 work days per month and 12 hours per day, equivalently, we 
get average total income about 32.08 baht/hour. 
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violating the rules; however, there was no punishment for any violation. The rules and 
regulations that were announced is as following: draw only one set at a time, finish and 
return the current set to your envelop before the next set are drawn and disallow changing 
any decision in finished sets. 
 
4. Results 
 
According to the issues of hypotheses, this section consists of two parts: the relationship 
between perceived intention and positive reciprocity (testing H1 and H2) and consistent 
decisions across treatments (testing H3 and H4). 
 
4.1 Perceived intention and positive reciprocity 
 
Table 2 Reciprocity rates in LHT and HHT, and p-value (2-tailed) from Wilcoxon signed-
rank test to test H1 
Treatments 
Reciprocity 
rate 
Wilcoxon 
signed-
rank test 
(2-tailed p 
value) 
LHT 29.1% 
0.56 
HHT 26.6% 
 
Table 2 presents results to test H1: reciprocity rates in LHT and HHT are equal. Although 
the reciprocity rate in LHT (29.1%) is different from in HHT (26.6%), Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test does not reject the null hypothesis that the rates are equal at 0.05 level of significance 
(if the p-value is greater than   then we do not reject the null hypothesis that two data 
have equal values at   level of significant). Hence, H1 is accepted.  
 
Table 3 Reciprocity rates in LHT and LLT, and p-value (1-tailed) from Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test to test H2 15 
Treatments 
Reciprocity 
rate 
Wilcoxon 
signed-rank 
test 
(1-tailed p 
value) 
LHT 29.1% 
0.02 
LLT 20.3% 
 
Similarly, to test H2: reciprocity rate in LHT is higher than in LLT, Table 3 shows the 
results that the rate in LHT (29.1%) is higher than in HHT (20.3%). The statistic test shows 
that the difference is statistically significant at the level of 0.05. We accept H2. 
 
4.2 Consistent decisions across treatments 
 
This study further explores how decisions across treatments were consistent by testing 
two hypotheses: a subject who took in high intention treatment will take in low one (H3) 
and a subject who returned in low intention treatment will return in high one (H4). 
 
                                            
15
 H2 - H4 are one-sided hypotheses, hence we use one-tailed p-values. 
11 
 
Table 4 Cross table between LHT and LLT, and measurements to test H3 and H4 (1-tailed 
p-value from Wilcoxon signed-rank test is presented in the parenthesis) 
  
LLT Measurements 
  
    
Taking in 
LLT given 
taking in 
LHT rate 
(TR) 
Reciprocity in 
LHT given 
reciprocity in 
LLT rate (RR) 
LHT 
  14 9 96.40% 87.50% 
  2 54 (0.08) (0.08) 
 
As presented in Table 4, the cross table presents a number of subjects in second-mover 
role who decided in LHT and LLT. For instance, as presented in the (          )  
(   ), nine subjects returned   in LHT but took in LLT. To answer the hypotheses, we use 
two conditional-probability measurements (each measurement for each hypothesis): rate 
of taking in LLT given taking in LHT (TR) and rate of reciprocity in LHT given reciprocity in 
LLT (RR). 
 
In an event that observing a subject, who had taken in LHT (n=56), took in LLT (n=54), TR 
  96.4% is the conditional probability of the event that means 96.4% of subjects who take 
in LHT will take in LLT. According to H3 that implies expected TR = 100%, although our 
measured TR is slightly less than the expectation, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test does not 
reject the null hypothesis that the TR is equal to 100% at 0.05 level of significance; hence, 
we accept H3. 
 
Similarly, in an event that observing a subject who had reciprocated in LLT (n=16), 
reciprocated in LLT (n=14), RR   87.5% is the conditional probability of this event that 
means 87.5% of subjects who reciprocate in LLT will reciprocate in LHT. According to H6 
that implies expected RR = 100%, the statistical test shows that the measured RR is equal 
to 100%; then H4 is accepted. 
 
5. Conclusions and remarks 
 
This study designed a material-payoff-approach experiment that has three trust games 
with different material-payoff structures to test a relationship between perceived intention 
from a decision and positive reciprocity. In this study, an important challenge was to 
design treatments with different levels of perceived intention of a decision, hence we 
theoretically develop a signalling model that explains how the intention is signalled and 
perceived. 
 
This study gets interesting results from the signalling model and the experiment data. 
From the model, cost of an action plays an important role in signalling and perceiving 
kindness intention; the more cost, the more kindness intention is signalled and perceived. 
Then, we applied the model's results to design treatments that tested the relationship 
between perceived intention and positive reciprocity. 
 
Moreover, according to the idea of Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989) that 
unexpected costly decision can induce reciprocity which is later named "surprise effect" by 
Morrison and Rutström (2002). The signalling model can be re-analyzed to explain how 
the surprise effect functions. We leave the analysis in Appendix. 
 
12 
 
From the experiment data, the results strongly support that perceived intention from a kind 
decision positively induces positive reciprocity. Moreover, the results support that 
decisions are consistent treatments with different levels of perceived intention for both 
forward argument (if positive reciprocity is induced in a low-intention treatment then it must 
be induced in a high-intention one), and backward argument (if positive reciprocity is not 
induced in a high-intention treatment then it must not be induced in a low-intention one). 
 
Besides the contributions to theoretical and behavioral understanding, the results in this 
study can be put into practice. For instance, since the cost of an action implies kindness 
intention and induces positive reciprocity, it provides an implication which is similar to -- 
sacrificing; one who sacrifices himself (as a costly action) for the goodness of others will 
be positively (and hugely) rewarded for his sacrificing with (for instance) fame, power, 
money, and social position as a -- hero! In other words, if you want to be rewarded from 
your action, others must know that the action is costly and for the sake of their well-beings. 
 
Although the results support that intention induces positive reciprocity, it is still far to 
conclude that; qualitative study like interview is necessary to deeply explore this question. 
Moreover, up to this study, at least three aspects of perceived intention have been stated 
and explored: ability to make a decision (McCabe, Rigdon & Smith 2003, Falk, Fehr & 
Fischbacher 2008), motivation (Stanca, Bruni & Corazzini 2009), and cost of action in this 
study; one may come up with a new aspect to be explored. Even one will stick to this 
study's aspect, one may extend to use other games or to do a filed study. Or even one will 
stick to the trust game in a lab experiment, one may use the decision method instead of 
this strategy method or introduce more factors. One interesting extension is to make a 
second mover can decide   (the amount of material payoffs that the second mover returns 
back) instead of fixing it; unlike this study that measured reciprocity qualitatively (0 = take 
and 1 = reciprocate), the extension may draw a picture that how the intention affects   and 
make reciprocity to be measured quantitatively. 
 
It is worth to make notes on weakness of the material-payoff approach. Changing material-
payoff structure is likely to unexpectedly introduce confounds. One must concern this 
important weak point for -- a clean experiment. 
 
Appendix 
 
Surprised effect and positive reciprocity 
 
This section aims to re-analyze the signalling model presented in section 3.2 to explain the 
Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989)'s idea, the surprise effect -- unexpected costly 
decision can induce reciprocity. According to (2), before the game will start, the second 
mover know that the first mover who has kindness intention    greater than the critical 
value  (   ),     (   ), will continue   the game, then he can utilize this knowledge to 
form his prior expectation on observing that a first mover will continue by  , | (   )-  
∫   (  )
 
 (  )
 where  (  ) is the prior distribution function over the first mover's kindness 
intention. Equivalently,  , | (   )- is the percentage of the first mover who will continue 
the game. And, according to Lemma 1 that  (   ) is increased in the cost of continuing  , 
the more   is the less  , | (   )-. 
 
The surprise effect occurs when the game is played and the second mover observes the 
first mover's continuing. Observing the first mover's continuing updates the second 
mover's expectation  , |    -   ; comparing between the prior expectation and the 
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updated expectation implies how much the second mover is surprised or the surprise 
effect  . 
 
DEFINITION 3  The surprise effect from observing the first mover's continuing is 
measured by             , | (   )-. 
 
Since the surprise effect   is closely related to the perceived intention   ̂. The relationship 
is as following: 
 
REMARK 1    The more   is the more   ̂. 
 
Equivalently we can say that the less prior percentage of the first mover who will continue 
 , | (   )- is the more perceived intention from continuing.  
 
To support the relationship between the prior expectation and perceived intention, here 
some discussions are; if you expect that a costly decision should not be made, observing 
that the decision is made implies the decision maker's intention of doing so; Or, like what 
Falk and Fischbacher (2006) proposed that perceived intention increases perception to 
kindness, we normally perceive kindness from an unexpected costly decision, that gives 
us favours, more than an expected one. 
 
Since the Definition 3 makes a link between the surprise effect and perceived intention, we 
can get the Proposition 1 and 2 that equivalently implies that an unexpected costly 
decision can induce reciprocity; hence our task is accomplished. 
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